Purpose: This paper aims to provide a comprehensive investigation into the determinants of auditor switching. By systematically reviewing and synthesizing key academic literature, it develops an integrated conceptual framework to explain why companies change their external auditors.

Design/methodology/approach: The study employs a systematic literature review and thematic synthesis. It draws upon 15 seminal and contemporary articles in the fields of accounting and auditing. The analysis is grounded in Agency Theory to interpret the motivations and conflicts that precipitate a change in the auditor-client relationship. Determinants identified in the literature are categorized into client-specific, auditor-specific, and relational/market factors to build a coherent explanatory model.

Findings: The synthesis confirms that auditor switching is a multifaceted phenomenon driven by a confluence of factors. Key determinants include client financial distress [4], the pursuit of lower audit fees [1, 15], and dissatisfaction with perceived audit quality [9]. Corporate governance mechanisms, particularly the role of the audit committee, are crucial in mediating these decisions, especially following adverse audit opinions [7]. Furthermore, the analysis reveals a complex relationship between auditor tenure and switching, where both very short and very long tenures can increase the likelihood of change [2, 10].

Originality/value: The paper’s primary contribution is its creation of a holistic, integrated framework from a previously fragmented body of research. It offers a clear and structured understanding of auditor switching dynamics, providing significant value to corporate boards, audit practitioners, investors, and regulators by demystifying the signals associated with an auditor change.