



TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA-USA RELATIONS

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ABSTRACT

The U.S.-China relationship is the most complex bilateral relationship for the United States. Over the last 30 years, Sino-American relations have undergone an impressive transformation from animosity and conflict to candid dialogue and constructive cooperation. These two vast and complicated countries have found common ground on issues of trade, investment and, more recently, security. But key issues remain unresolved, and the potential for troubling divergence is real as China becomes an economic powerhouse, a military force in Asia, and a potential rival to U.S. hegemony.

In this article described the transformation of China-USA relations from the period of post-World War II. The U.S.-China relationship is the most complex bilateral relationship for the United States. Over the last 30 years, Sino-American relations have undergone an impressive transformation from animosity and conflict to candid dialogue and constructive cooperation. These two vast and complicated countries have found common ground on issues of trade, investment and, more recently, security. But key issues remain

unresolved, and the potential for troubling divergence is real as China becomes an economic powerhouse, a military force in Asia, and a potential rival to U.S. hegemony.

KEYWORDS

US-China Relations, New Cold War, Hegemonic Competition, Great Power Politics, Realism, Liberalism.

INTRODUCTION

Introduction in 2014, Russia and the West entered into a fierce conflict against the background of the Ukrainian crisis. At that time, there was an impression that Moscow was doomed to stand alone against a strong and strong opponent. Within a few months, their relationship lost the remnants of the previous twenty years of cooperation and, in fact, entered a new CoUnlike the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in a rather vulnerable position. The economic, military and human potential of the country was unprecedented, while the West increased its capabilities. In addition, Russia avoided ideologizing its foreign policy - unlike the USSR, it offered the world a completely valuable ideological alternative. But the new structural realities of international relations differ more important. If in the 20th century the confrontation between the "socialist East" and the

"liberal West" set the pace and determined the structure of international relations, then in the 21st century the conflict between Russia and the West became only one of the episodes. The main intrigue revolves around China's politics and the nature of its relationship with the United States, a single global powerful. Over the past forty years after the fateful decisions of Deng Xiaopin, the PRC has made a huge breakthrough in economic, technological and military-political terms. The rise of China in the United States is increasingly alarming. By the early 2020s, it had evolved into recognizing China as a threat to the security of the United States and the "liberal world order" under them. The American authorities spoke openly about the new Cold War. The restriction of China was established at the level of the main doctrinal documents and went into practice in the form of increasing ideological and trade and economic

pressure on Beijing. The COVID-19 epidemic only gave impetus to the anti-Chinese course. The United States directly blamed China for the emergence and spread of the disease. In the United States, the approaches to China went through radical ideologization in the spirit of "communist China against the Democratic United States." In turn, China has always preferred to avoid open provocations. He still refrains from strict rhetoric against the United States and the West, although he is clearly responding to individual ignorant steps. Chinese policy is not characterized by the export of its ideological model. Obviously, the Chinese leadership knows that the actions of the United States are not just an increase in rates for positive negotiations and future compromises. The worst scenario is becoming increasingly clear, such as the isolation of the PRC, the displacement of the country from high-tech value chains, the slowdown in growth rates, the arms race and marginalization in international relations. (Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.) generally share Washington's concerns about China.

An important feature of the beginning of the new Cold War is the absence of formalized antagonistic coalitions. The transatlantic security

system was formed to include the USSR. The aggravation of relations with Russia gave him a new life. But even if the European Union recognizes America as its main ally and partner, it is clear that it is not ready to intervene in the confrontation between the United States and China. For the European Union, the confrontation is fraught with the loss of the Chinese market and many mutually beneficial ties. US military allies in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.) generally share Washington's concerns over China. But given the depth of trade relations with China, they are hardly ready for a complete Cold War. Difficulties also arise with the participation of other players in the coalition against China, primarily India. Delhi has its own turbulent relationship and deep confrontation with Beijing. But India also does not want to take tough obligations to hold China under the leadership of the United States. China, in turn, did not form a coalition against the West. Russia and China are included in the list of enemies separated by commas in US doctrinal documents. But there is no military-political alliance between them, although the partnership is deep and the level of trust is at an unprecedented level. Another important feature is the preservation of close ties between China and the United States in the field

of Economics. The same can be said for most of the US allies. Obviously, the disruption of their economic ties will have global consequences for the world economy. The current situation raises a number of questions. How irreversible is the confrontation between Washington and Beijing? How far can it go? How is the situation and strategy perceived on the US side-what are the reasons for such an active transition to the Cold War regime? What are similar concepts and strategies in the. How can Beijing respond to The Washington attack? This report is an attempt to answer questions asked from the point of view of two Russian experts, one of whom is a specialist in the United States and the other in China. We will try to repeat the views of America and China on the “new Cold War. About the illusions of new bipolarity since the founding of the people's Republic of China, the US policy towards the PRC has included both periods of competition and partnership. In 1949, the victory of the Armed Forces of the Communist Party of China and later close cooperation with the Soviet Union determined the United States' strict containment policy. In Washington, China was regarded as one of the main opponents. The PRC and the US armed forces faced directly during the Korean War of 1950-1953, as well as the crises in the Taiwan

Strait (1954-1955 and 1958). The United States has been providing large amounts of military assistance to Taiwan to this day.

MAIN PART

US economic sanctions against China were applied even before the formation of the PRC. The Chinese Committee (ChinCom) has been operating since 1947, along with the Coordinating Committee for export control (CoCom), which deals with sanctions against the USSR and its allies. However, since the late 1960s, against the background of a significant deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations, serious changes have occurred in relations between the United States and China. The US has relaxed trade restrictions. American diplomacy was able to achieve a situation in which the Soviet Union should simultaneously include both the United States and China. After the start of Deng Xiaopin's reforms, the rapprochement between China and the United States continued against the background of the liberalization of Chinese trade and the rapid development of trade and economic relations.

In 1989, due to events in Tiananmen Square, the establishment of cooperation stumbled. In February 1990, the US Congress approved PL 101-2461, which provided for comprehensive sanctions against China. To one degree or another, they still operate today. It was primarily about limiting the supply of weapons, closing access to assistance programs, strict export control over two-purpose goods (satellites, nuclear technologies, computers), restrictions on defense companies, etc. Nevertheless, economic cooperation developed rapidly. The 2000 law "on normal trade relations with China" recorded a sharp increase in trade and economic relations

In general, after the end of the Cold War and until Donald Trump came to power in the United States, America's policy towards Beijing was based on several contradictory, but rather balanced attitudes. On the one hand, Washington came from the advantages of trade and economic cooperation with China. The PRC has been seen as one of the major emerging powers that cooperate on a wide range of issues and at the same time participate in the liberal world order.

On the other hand, the Americans were concerned about the gradual growth of Chinese military power, the incompleteness of market reforms, the

High role of the state and the transparency of the economy, the state of human rights and the nodemocratic (therefore closed to external forces). influence) political system. This balance looks good in US national security strategies. They also indicate changes in the proportions of the two components. On the other hand, the Americans were concerned about the gradual growth of Chinese military power, the incompleteness of market reforms, the High role of the state and the transparency of the economy, the state of human rights and the nodemocratic (therefore closed to external forces). influence) political system. This balance looks good in US national security strategies. They also indicate changes in the proportions of the two components. For example, the 1999 strategy, prepared at the end of Bill Clinton's presidency, was largely preserved in the tones of cooperation. The same can be said about the 2002 strategy, which was prepared during the first period of George W. Bush. True, he pointed to the use of "outdated" approaches to China in relation to national prestige-the preservation of the remnants of the political regime and the formation of armed forces that threaten neighbors. Chinese reforms and incomplete transit were also recorded in the 2006

strategyThe importance of China as a partner of the United States is highlighted in Barack Obama's first national security strategy in 2010. Although he notes the growing military power of the PRC, the approach to it is determined from the point of view of dialogue (the PRC's belief that the growing power should be directed in a peaceful direction). US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's 2011 political article on the "US Pacific age" also had a balanced tone: yes, there are problems in relationships, but they require constant dialogue, regardless of whether we are talking about the economy or military-political issues. The issue of human rights is relevant, but this is only one of the components of the US approach to China. A similar paradigm is in the 2015 strategy. expressed, although by that time some changes had occurred in US-Chinese relations. The situation in the South China Sea has escalated, and fears about China's industrial espionage and hostile activities in the digital environment have intensified in Washington. In 2015, Barack Obama had declared a state of emergency in connection with events in the digital environment. Executive Order No. 13694 applied lockdown and visa sanctions against those involved in or associated with malicious actions in cyberspace. The emergence of the decree was

associated with the attack of hackers associated with the Chinese government and the theft of personal data of more than 4 million US civil servants. However, the text of the decree did not mention the name of China, and the incident itself was resolved diplomatically. After Donald Trump came to power, the balanced approach of the United States to China has changed dramatically. The shift towards confrontation is evident in the US national security strategy for 2017. China is positioned as a threat similar to or equivalent to Russia. Both public policies are defined as "revisionist forces" that are directly opposite to American interests and values. China's overseas infrastructure projects are now seen as a means of achieving competitive advantage over the United States and forecasting their impact on the world. That is, from the local issue, China's economic policy has become a threat to the national security of the United States, as well as its allies, including the EU countries. The 2017 Strategy has almost nothing to say about the benefits of cooperation or mutual trade with China.

CONCLUSION

The 2017 Strategy rules were enshrined by the White House in a document called the US strategic approach to China in 2020. Its main message is that forty years after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and the start of large-scale cooperation, Washington is desperate to democratize the Chinese state and turn it into a full-fledged market economy. China has become neither one nor the other. This opportunity is becoming a threat to the US economy, security, values and leadership.

This should include pressure and a barrier to China to the prosperity of the United States, to protect the state, to provide peace with power and to strengthen American influence in the world. At the same time, competition should not go beyond dangerous boundaries and turn into confrontation or open confrontation. The document summarizes U.S. claims against China. The surplus power of industry, protectionism and the means of government give China advantages that are not present in the market economy. Hence, the PRC develops at their expense and conducts unfair competition. In addition, the threat to US security is the borrowing of American technologies, the creation of rules by which American firms will be forced to

transfer their technology to China, the seizure of American companies, the violation of intellectual property and industrial espionage. Naturally, the Chinese project Belt and Road also achieved this. The author of the document considers it a political project to reformulate the rules and standards of the global game in favor of China. Americans believe that instead of encouraging progress, it will lead to corruption, pollution, opaque loans and financial transactions, as well as make foreign countries the slaves of China. The activity of China in the use of economic means for political purposes (in fact, in the form of sanctions) is also assessed as a threat. Another group of claims is the fight against American values. Americans strive for China's pursuit of global leadership, including by promoting its own model, which the authors of the document understand as a mixture of Marxism-Leninism, nationalism, one-party dictatorship, a special interpretation of Directive economics. The suffocation of human rights and control over science and technology are in the hands of the state. This argument is supported by references to the suppression of the opposition, censorship and minority offenses in China itself. The third group is security issues. China has become a major military force. Its nuclear potential is increasing. In addition, China has

become a strong player in the digital and information space. All these difficulties require strict efforts. In addition to the military suspension, they should include the introduction of tough, accurate and verifiable agreements to Beijing, based on the experience of many of China's obligations that it has violated in the past. Strong efforts are required to counter attempts to stop cyber espionage and intellectual property leaks, and to use workarounds to influence information campaigns and the United States such as universities and research centers. According to the strategy, it is necessary to radically change the balance of economic relations between the United States and China. The document set the task of expanding the influence of the United States, as well as strengthening relations with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region. At the same time, it was noted that the United States does not want to impose democracy on China, does not want to interfere in its affairs and does not want to bring the situation to confrontation. It is necessary to cooperate with China where it is in the interests of America. From a practical point of view, the Trump administration has significantly increased pressure on China. In addition, the direction of the administration as a whole was supported by

Congress. Trade, sanctions, ideological and military-political measures can be distinguished here. In terms of trade, the United States aims to reduce the large trade deficit with China. By 2018, it was \$ 378.6 billion, an increase of \$ 43.6 billion compared to 2017. By 2019, it decreased by 345.2 billion. This partly caused an increase in US tariffs. Americans constantly increased them during 2018 (solar panels, electronics, medical products). And although Beijing imposed retaliatory duties and filed a lawsuit with the WTO, the US administration still managed to impose trade negotiations on China. On January 15, 2020, an agreement was signed on the first stage of the trade agreement. China promised to significantly change the trade regime in the fields of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services and currency, and also committed to expanding US imports. In return, the US was forced to reduce a number of tariffs . However, the implementation of the agreements was postponed by the US president due to the COVID-19 epidemic, in which Donald Trump blamed China. Along with the tariff policy, the United States introduced sanctions restrictions in a very aggressive way. The authors of last year's report on the sanctions war between Beijing and Washington noted that the scale of the

measures used by the American side has expanded. Along with tariffs, it was about expanding export control, limiting Chinese investment, financial sanctions, limiting the import of Chinese products, etc.

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